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Abstract. Why are we deeply moved by the misfortune of Anna Karenina if we are 
fully aware that she is simply a fictional character who does not exist in our world? 
But what does it mean that fictional characters do not exist? The present article is 
concerned with the ontology of fictional characters. The author concludes that 
successful fictional characters become paramount examples of the ‘real’ human 
condition because they live in an incomplete world what we have cognitive access 
to but cannot influence in any way and where no deeds can be undone. Unlike all 
the other semiotic objects, which are culturally subject to revisions, and perhaps 
only similar to mathematical entities, the fictual characters will never change and 
will remain the actors of what they did once and forever 
 
In 1860, on the verge of sailing through the Mediterranean to follow 
Garibaldi’s expedition to Sicily, Alexandre Dumas stopped in Mar-
seille and wanted to visit the Chateau d’If where his hero Edmond 
Dantès, before becoming the Count of Montecristo, spent fourteen 
years of his life, and was visited and rescued in his cell by the Abbot 
Faria. During his visit Dumas discovered that the visitors were shown 
the “real” cell of Montecristo, and the guides were speaking of him, 
Faria and other characters of the novel as if they had really existed. On 
the contrary, the same guides ignored the fact that a historical figure 
like Mirabeau had been imprisoned at the Chateau d’If.  
Thus Dumas comments in his Memoirs: “It is the privilege of no-
velists to create characters who kill those of the historians. The reason 
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is that historians only evoke mere ghosts, while novelists create 
persons in flesh and bones”.  
Once a friend of mine urged me to organize a symposium on the 
following subject: why — since we know that Anna Karenina is a 
fictional character who does not exist in our real world — do we weep 
for her deeds (or in any case, we are deeply moved by her mis-
fortunes)?  
Probably many sophisticated readers will not cry on the fate of 
Scarlett O’Hara but they, too, are certainly shocked by the fate of Anna 
Karenina.  
I resolutely told my friend that this phenomenon had neither 
ontological nor logical relevance, and could only interest psychologists. 
Moreover, we certainly can identify ourselves with the cases of fictio-
nal characters, but this does not occur only in reading fiction. Many of 
us have sometimes thought of the possible death of a beloved person, 
and felt touched, if not moved to tears, even though they knew for sure 
that the imagined event had not taken place.  
Later, I had to admit that there is a difference between weeping for 
the imagined death of our beloved and weeping for the death of Anna 
Karenina. In the first case, when after the daydream we are asked if 
our beloved has really passed away, we say that it was not true — as it 
happens when we suddenly awake from a nightmare and we realize 
with relief that it was only a hallucination. On the contrary, if we were 
asked if Anna Karenina died we would always answer positively, as if 
the fact that Anna committed suicide were true in every possible world. 
Moreover, some people are pulled to suicide when abandoned by 
their beloved, but I have never heard of somebody who committed 
suicide because one of his friends had been abandoned by his fiancé. 
Thus it seems strange that, when reading that Goethe’s Werther killed 
himself because of his ill-fated love, many romantic youngsters did the 
same, by the so-called Werther effect.  
It seems funny that we deeply share the sorrow of somebody else 
only or mainly when we know that he or she never existed. But what 
does it mean that fictional characters do not have some kind of 
existence? According to Meinong, every representation or judgment 
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has necessarily an object, even though this object is not necessarily an 
existing one. Centuries before Meinong, Avicenna said that existence 
was only an accidental property of an essence or substance (accidens 
adveniens quidditati). In this sense there can be abstract objects (like 
the number 17 of the right angle, which do not properly exist but 
subsist) and concrete objects like myself and Anna Karenina, with the 
difference that I am a Physically Existing Object while Anna is not. 
Now, today I am not concerned with the ontology of fictional 
characters.  
Since the core of my reflections today is why people feel moved by 
fictional characters, I am obliged to consider Anna Karenina as a mind 
dependent object, or the object of cognition. In other terms, my 
approach is not an ontological but a semiotic one. My concern is not 
in which sense the assertion Anna Karenina committed suicide is true 
but rather why a normal reader can accept the assertion Anna Kare-
nina committed suicide as true even when he or she knows that Anna 
is a narrative figment? 
By definition fictional texts clearly speak of non-existing persons 
and events and from the point of view of truth conditional semantics, 
a fictional assertion should always tell what is not real-life. 
In spite of that we do not take fictional assertions as lies. First of all, 
in reading a piece of fiction we subscribe a silent agreement with its 
author, who pretends that something is true and asks us to pretend to 
take it seriously. Secondly, we know that every fiction designs a 
possible world and all our judgements of truth and falsehood must 
concern that possible world. In this way it is true in the Conan Doyle’s 
world that Sherlock Holmes lived on Baker Street and false that he 
lived in Tartu and we can bet our life in this point. 
 
 
Fictional versus historical assertions 
 
Is a fictional assertion like Anna Karenina commits suicide by throwing 
herself in the path of a train as true as the historical assertion Adolf 
Hitler committed suicide (and his corpse was burned) in a bunker in 
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Berlin? Our instinctive reaction would be that the assertion about 
Anna refers to an invention while the one about Hitler concerns what 
was really the case. 
Thus, to be correct in terms of truth conditional semantics, we 
should say that it is true that Anna Karenina commits suicide by 
throwing herself in the path of a train is only another way for saying it 
is true in this world that in a Tolstoj’s novel it is written that Anna 
Karenina commits suicide by throwing herself in the path of a train. 
If so, in logical terms the truth about Anna would be true de dicto 
and not de re, and from a semiotic point of view it would concern the 
plane of expression and not the plane of content (or, in Saussure’s terms, 
the level of the signifier and not that of the signified).  
We can make true statements about fictional characters because 
what happens to them is recorded in a text, and a text is like a musical 
score. It is true that Anna Karenina commits suicide by throwing herself 
in the path of a train in the same way in which it is true that 
Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony is in C minor (and not in F major like his 
Sixth) and begins with “G, G, G, E flat”. 
However, such a position is not completely satisfying from the 
point of view of the experience of a reader. By disregarding a lot of 
problems concerning the reading of a score as a complex process of 
interpretation, let us say that a musical score is a semiotic device 
which tells one how to produce a given sequence of sounds, and only 
after the transformation of a series of written signs into sounds the 
listeners can say that they are enjoying the Fifth Symphony (and this 
happens even to a very skilled musician, able to read the score silently, 
but in fact reproducing the sounds in his mind). When we say that it is 
true in this world that in a Tolstoj’s novel it is written that Anna 
Karenina commits suicide by throwing herself in the path of a train we 
simply say that it is true in this world that on a given printed page 
there is a sequence of written words by pronouncing which (even 
though only mentally) the reader will afterwards realize that there 
should be a narrative world where persons like Anna and Vronskij 
exist.  
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But when speaking of Anna Karenina or Vronskij, we usually do 
not consider any longer the page where we read about their vicis-
situdes but rather speak of them in the same way as if they were 
“persons”.  
Do not forget that our problem is why we can be emotionally mo-
ved by the deeds of fictional characters. In spite of every logician 
nobody is supposed to weep because Tolstoj wrote that Anna Karenina 
died. This is none of our business. One feels moved, at most, because 
Anna Karenina died — even if one ignores that it was Tolstoj who first 
wrote it. 
Nobody can reasonably deny that Hitler and Anna Karenina are 
two different kinds of entity, with a different ontological status. Hitler 
existed physically and Anna did not. In spite of this we can say that 
not only fictional assertions but also the historical ones are de dicto: 
the students who write that Hitler died in a bunker in Berlin simply 
state that this is true according to their history textbook. In other 
words, except for judgments depending on my direct experience (of 
the kind it’s raining), all the judgments I can make on the grounds of 
my cultural experience (that is, all those concerning the information 
recorded in an encyclopaedia) are based on textual information and, 
even though they seem to express de facto truths, they are merely de 
dicto.  
Encyclopaedic assertions are, however, still open to revisions. If we 
keep a scientific mind, we must be ready to revise our opinions about 
Hitler’s death whenever new documents will be discovered. Moreover, 
the fact that Hitler died in a bunker has already been questioned by 
some historians. On the contrary, the assertion Anna Karenina 
commits suicide cannot be cast in doubt.  
 
 
Fluctuating individuals in fluctuating scores 
 
Notice that what I have just said holds true for Anna Karenina, 
Hamlet and many others but not for every fictional character. There 
are a lot of interesting narrative characters who have remained 
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unknown to the great majority of readers and stand so to speak 
prisoner of their original score. On the other hand, I have recently 
read that according to a reliable test, many Britons believe that Sher-
lock Holmes and Eleanor Rigby really existed.  
Hamlet or Sherlock Holmes acquired a sort of existence inde-
pendent of their original scores. Many fictional characters “live” 
outside the score which has given them existence, and move to a zone 
of the universe which we find very difficult to delimit. Some of them 
even migrate from text to text because the collective imagination has, 
over the course of the centuries, made emotional investments in them 
and has transformed them into fluctuating individuals.  
It is not indispensable that they come from great works of art or 
from popular legends. In this sense we have appointed Hamlet and 
Robin Hood, Heathcliff and Milady, Leopold Bloom and Mickey 
Mouse as fluctuating entities. Becoming a fluctuating entity does not 
depend on the aesthetic qualities of the original score. Why so many 
people suffer for the suicide of Anna Karenina and only a small bunch 
of Hugo’s addicts sympathize with the suicide of Cimourdain in 
Ninety Three? Personally I feel the fate of Cimourdain (a gigantic 
hero) more touching than the one of that poor lady. Too bad, the 
majority is against me.  
On the contrary, Dido or Medea, Don Quijote, Madame Bovary, 
Holden Caulfield, Gatsby, Philip Marlowe, Maigret or Hercule Poirot 
became individuals living outside their original scores, and even those 
who have never read these original texts can claim to make true 
statements about them.  
Being independent of the text and of the possible world where they 
were born, they are (so to speak) circulating among us, and we en-
counter some difficulties in not considering them real persons. 
Let us define the epistemological status of these entities better.  
A fluctuating character exhibits a core of properties that seem to be 
identified by everybody: for instance Little Red Riding Hood is a girl, 
she wears a red cap, she met a wolf who later devoured her and her 
grandmother, even though different people can have different ideas 
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about the age of the girl, the kind of food she had in her basket, and so 
on.  
It has been suggested that a fictional character is an object of 
higher order, that is, one of these objects that are something more than 
the sum of their properties. What is crucial for the recognition of the 
object is that it maintains a Gestalt, a constant relation between its 
elements even if these elements are no longer the same. A typical 
example of higher order object is a melody. Chopin’s Piano Sonata 
No.2 in B flat minor op.35 will remain melodically recognizable even if 
played with a mandolin. From an aesthetic point of view the result 
would be disastrous, but the melodic pattern would be preserved — 
and it would be recognizable also if some notes would be dropped.  
It would be interesting to decide which notes can be dropped 
without destroying the musical Gestalt and which ones are on the 
contrary essential or diagnostic in order to identify that melody as 
such. It is not a theoretical problem, it is rather a task for a musical 
critic, and it will have different solutions according to the object of 
analysis. However, this reflection is important because the same 
problem exists when we are dealing with a fictional character. There 
are two versions of Little Red Riding Hood’s story, the Perrault’s and 
the Grimms’ one, and in the former the girl is not rescued by the 
hunters and dies devoured by the wolf. Curiously enough, she remains 
the same individual in both versions, while (I suspect) nobody would 
recognize her if she appeared as a young lady, dressed like a princess, 
without the red cap.  
Would Madame Bovary still be Madame Bovary if she did not 
commit suicide? There is a short story by Woody Allen called The 
Kugelmass Episode (published in Side Effects) where Madame Bovary is 
brought by a sort of time-machine to have a love affair in today’s New 
York. Emma Bovary appears as a parody of the original character, she 
wears contemporary dresses and behaves as a Tiffany-goer, but she is 
still recognizable because she keeps most of her basic properties — 
namely, she is a petty bourgeois and the wife of a doctor, she lives 
usually at Yonville, she is unsatisfied with her countryside life, she is 
inclined to adultery. In Allen’s story the suicide is not mentioned; but 
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it is essential for the ironic quality of the narration that Emma be 
fascinating (and desirable) just because she was on the verge of 
committing suicide — and Kugelmass is obliged to science-fictionally 
enter Flaubert’s world before Emma had her last adulterous relation, 
just in order not arrive too late. 
We can thus assume that a fictional character remains the same 
even if it is set in a different context, provided diagnostic properties (to 
be defined for each case) are preserved. 
 
 
Fictional characters as semiotic objects 
 
At this point, I cannot escape the basic ontological question: which 
kind of entities are fictional characters and in which way they, if do 
not exist, at least subsist? 
Being a set of properties, a fictional character is a semiotic object. I 
define so every device by which an expression conveys a set of pro-
perties as its content — provided one assumes that every expression (a 
word, an image or some other device) is, as Searle has suggested, a peg 
for hanging descriptions, or properties. 
From my point of view, these “pegs” are not only proper names but 
all expressions which convey as their proper content whatever we are 
used to call the meaning or the signified of the expression: the idea of 
an animal, of a place, of a thing, of a feeling, of an action, of a 
natural law like universal gravitation, of a mathematical entity, et 
cetera. Thus the expression dog conveys as its content the properties of 
being an animal, a mammal, a canid, a barking creature, the man’s 
best friend and many others registered by a comprehensive encyclo-
paedia. These properties can at their turn be interpreted by other 
expressions and the series of these interrelated interpretations consti-
tutes the whole of the notions shared by a community, socially and 
collectively recorded.  
There are many kinds of semiotic object, some of them re-
presenting Physically Existing Objects or classes of Physically Existing 
Objects (like the ones conveyed by such terms as horse or flower, and 
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more or less corresponding to the classical universals like the Platonic 
“horseness”), others representing abstract notions or ideal objects (like 
freedom and justice or square roots), others that have been labelled as 
social objects, among which belong marriages, money, diplomas, and 
in general all entities whose nature is a law established by a collective 
agreement. But there are also semiotic objects representing human (or 
humanized) individuals. I do not share the theory of Kripke’s rigid 
designation and I believe that the proper name ‘Napoleon’ conveys the 
properties of being born in Ajaccio, to have been a French general, to 
have become an emperor, to have won at Austerlitz, to have died at 
Saint Helena on May 5, 1821, and so on. The same holds for the 
proper name ‘Barack Obama’. Among the bearers of proper names, 
the great majority has the property of having existed physically in 
some spatio-temporal location. Notwithstanding there are proper 
names conveying the properties of individuals characterized by the 
feature of being fictive (and as such they are usually registered by a 
good encyclopaedia). 
The existence of fictional characters obliges semiotics to revise 
some of its approaches that risk looking excessively simplified. The 
classical semantic triangle usually appears this way (Fig. 1): 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The classical representation of the semantic triangle. 
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An expression along with its content is a semiotic object. The referent 
is inserted in this triangle owing to the fact that we frequently use 
expressions in order to indicate something physically existing in our 
world. This happens when we speak of my friend John, of Milan or of 
Tartu, of that microphone on that table, of the fact that outside it’s 
raining.  
I do not believe that we are performing an act of reference when we 
say that dogs are animals or that all cats are nice: in these cases we are 
still making judgements about a given semiotic object (a class) 
predicating some of its properties. In other terms, a scientist can claim 
to have discovered a new property of apples, and in asserting that she 
is still pronouncing a semiotic judgement; whereas she implements an 
act of reference only when she says or writes in her protocols that she 
tested those properties of apples (in general) on the real individual 
apples A, B, C (then indicating the series of real objects she used to 
perform her experiments to legitimate her induction). 
We perform acts of reference when we speak of individuals but 
there is a difference between referring to existing individuals and 
mentioning individuals who existed in the past. In the content of the 
expression ‘Napoleon’ the property of being dead on May 5, 1821, 
should be registered among his properties. On the contrary, the 
properties of the content of the expression ‘Obama’, must include 
being alive and the president of the U.S.  
When referring to still living individuals the semantic triangle 
could be the following (Fig. 2): 
 
 
 
Figure 2. The semantic triangle when referring to a living individual called 
Obama. 
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In this case speakers who utter p referring to Obama, invite their 
addressees to verify p (if they want) in a precise spatio-temporal 
location of the physically existing world. On the contrary, who utters p 
referring to Napoleon is not inviting people to verify p in a past world. 
Unless one has a time-machine, one cannot go back in the past to 
check if Napoleon really won at Austerlitz. Any assertion about Napo-
leon either says which are the properties conveyed by the expression 
‘Napoleon’, or concerns and refers to a newly found document that 
changes what we believed until now, let’s say, about the death of 
Napoleon — for instance, that he did not die on May 5th but on May 
6th. Only when the scientific community has verified that the docu-
ment under question is a Physically Existing Object, we can proceed to 
the correction of the encyclopaedia, that is, of the properties attributed 
to Napoleon as a semiotic object. 
It can happen that Napoleon becomes the main character of a 
biographical reconstruction (not to speak of a historical novel) that 
tries to make him live again in his time, reconstructing his actions and 
even his feelings. In this case, Napoleon becomes very similar to a 
fictional character. We know that he really existed but in order to take 
part in his life we try to imagine his past world as it were a possible 
world of a novel.  
What really happens with fictional characters? It is true that some 
of them are introduced as somebody who lived once upon a time (like 
Little Red Riding Hood and Anna Karenina), but we have ascertained 
that by virtue of a narrative agreement the reader is bound to take for 
true what is narrated and to pretend to live in the possible world of the 
narration as it were his or her real one. At this point it is irrelevant 
whether the story speaks about an allegedly living person (like a given 
detective acting in Los Angeles) or about an allegedly dead person. It is 
like in this world somebody told us that one of our relatives has just 
dead. Our emotional involvement would be about somebody who is 
still present in the world of our experience. 
Thus the possible semantic triangle should assume this new form 
(Fig. 3). 
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Figure 3. Semantic triangle in case of fictional characters. 
 
 
When speaking of Anna Karenina, one makes a virtual reference to 
the inhabitants of a possible fictional world as if they were real persons. 
When we are shocked by a daydream where our beloved dies, at the 
end of our reverie we come back to our everyday life and we recognize 
that we had no real reasons to worry.  
To be permanently sentimentally involved with the inhabitants of a 
fictional possible world we must then satisfy two requirements: (i) we 
must live in the fictional possible world as in an uninterrupted 
daydream; and (ii) we must in some way behave as if we were one of 
its characters. 
It can thus happen that, when we enter a very absorbing and capti-
vating possible narrative world, a textual strategy can provoke some-
thing similar to a mystic raptus or to a hallucination, and we simply 
forget that we entered an only possible world. It happens especially 
when we meet a character in its original score or in a new enticing 
context. But since these characters are fluctuating and, so to speak, 
they come and go in our mind, like the women in the James Prufrock’s 
world, talking of Michelangelo, they are always ready to mesmerize us, 
and to make us believe that they are among us. 
As for the second requirement, once we live in a possible world as 
if it was the real one, we can be disturbed by the fact that in that world 
we are not, so to speak, formally registered (in that world we do not 
exist) and we are drawn to assume the personality of somebody else 
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who has the right to live there. Thus we identify ourselves with one of 
the fictional characters.  
However, when awaking from a daydream in which our beloved 
dies, we recognize that what we imagined was false and we take for 
true the assertion my beloved is still well and alive. On the contrary, 
when the fictional hallucination stops (simply because le vent se lève, il 
faut tenter de vivre), we continue to take for true that Anna Karenina 
committed suicide, Oedipus killed his father and Sherlock Holmes 
lives on Baker Street.  
It happens that, being fluctuating entities, these faithful compa-
nions of our life have an additional virtue: unlike all the other semiotic 
objects, which are culturally subject to revisions, and perhaps only 
similar to mathematical entities, they will never change and will 
remain the actors of what they did once and forever — and it is 
because of the incorrigibility of their deeds that we can dare to say that 
it is true that they were or did this and that. 
 
 
On other semiotic objects 
 
Is there anybody else who shares the same fate? Yes, there are the 
heroes and divinities of every mythology and many other legendary 
beings like unicorns, dwarves, fairies and Santa Claus, as well as 99% 
of the entities in various religions. It is obvious that for an atheist every 
religious entity is a fictional one, while for a believer there is 
somewhere a spiritual world of supernatural objects (like gods, angels 
and so on), inaccessible to our senses but absolutely “real” (and in this 
sense an atheist and a believer rely on two different ontologies). 
However, if Roman Catholics recognize a personal God as really 
existent and assume that from Him and from His Son proceeds the 
Holy Ghost, then they must consider Allah, Shiva or the Great Spirit 
of the Prairies as mere fictions — designed by a sacred narration. 
Likewise, for a Buddhist the God of the Bible is a mere fictional 
individual and Gitchi Manitou is an equally fictional individual for a 
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Muslim as well as for a Christian. This means that for a believer in 
whatever confession all the religious entities of the other religions 
(that is, an overwhelming majority of entities) are fictional indivi-
duals — so that we are entitled to consider more or less ninety per cent 
of religious entities as fiction.  
One could object that, at least for the believers in religion X, 
their divinity really exists, while for all the fans of Alice she is a non-
Physically Existing Object. But if we were going to test the true beliefs 
of common people we would discover that many Christians are not 
sure that Jesus really resurrected; others go to the Mass but are very 
doubtful about the real existence of the Holy Ghost; others sincerely 
believe in God but think that Jesus was only a very virtuous human 
being; and finally many Catholics still consider certain saints as 
persons who really existed while the Roman Church has officially 
declared that they were a legend. Conversely, we have seen that some 
Britons believe that Holmes was a real person and many Christian 
poets started their works by invoking the Muses or Apollo — and we 
do not exactly understand if they simply used a literary topos or were 
in some way taking the divinities of the Olympus seriously. Many 
mythological characters have become protagonists of narrations, and 
in a symmetrical way many protagonists of secular narrations have 
become very similar to the characters of mythological tales, so that 
mythical heroes and gods, literary characters and religious entities are 
frequently separated by imprecise borderlines.  
 
 
The ethical power of fictional characters 
 
We have said that unlike all the other semiotic objects, which are 
culturally subject to revisions, and perhaps only similar to mathe-
matical entities, fictional characters will never change and will remain 
the actors of what they did once and forever — and it is because of the 
incorrigibility of their deeds that we can dare to say that it is true that 
they were or did this and that. 
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That is why they are important for us, even from a moral point of 
view. 
Just think — we are watching Oedipus Rex and we feel sorry that 
this fellow did not take any other road instead of the one where he met 
and murdered his father, and wonder why he reached Tebes and not, 
let us say, Athens, where he could have married Phryne or Aspasia? 
We read Hamlet asking why such a nice boy could not marry Ophelia 
and live with her happily, having killed that scoundrel of his uncle and 
gently kicked his mother out of Danmark? Why Heathcliff did not 
tolerate his humiliations a little more, waiting until he could marry 
Catherine and live with her as a respected country gentleman? Why 
prince Andrej could not recover from his mortal illness and marry 
Natasha? Why Raskolnikov had the morbid idea of killing an old lady 
instead of finishing his studies and becoming a respected professional? 
Why, when Gregor Samsa was transformed into a horrible bug, a 
beautiful princess did not arrive, kissing him and transforming him 
into the most handsome young man in Prague? Why on the arid hills 
of Spain Robert Jordan could not beat those fascist pigs and join again 
his sweet Maria? 
Now, in principle it is enough to buy a computer program for 
rewriting Oedipus, Hamlet, Wuthering Heights, War and Peace, Crime 
and Punishment, The Metamorphosis, For Whom the Bell Tolls. We 
can do it. But do we really want to do so? 
The devastating experience of discovering that, in spite of our 
wishes, Hamlet, Robert Jordan or Prince Andrej died, that things 
happened in that way, and forever, no matter what we wanted, hoped 
or yearned during the course of our reading, makes us to feel the 
shiver of Destiny. We realize that we cannot decide whether Ahab will 
capture the Whale or not. The real lesson of Moby Dick is that the 
whale goes wherever She wants. 
The charm of the great tragedies comes from the fact that their 
heroes, instead of escaping an atrocious fate, fall into the abyss that 
they have dug with their own hands because they do not know what 
expects them — and we, who we see clearly where they are blindly 
going, cannot stop them. We have a cognitive access to the world of 
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Oedipus and we know everything about him and Jocasta but they, 
even if living in a parasitical world which depends on our own, do not 
know anything about us. A fictional character cannot communicate 
with his/her counterparts in the actual world. 1 
Such a problem is not as whimsical as it seems. Please try to take it 
seriously. Oedipus cannot conceive of the world of Sophocles — 
otherwise he would have not married his mother. Fictional characters 
live in an incomplete (or, to be more rude and politically incorrect) 
handicapped world.  
But when we really understand their fate, we start to suspect that 
we, too, as the citizens of the actual world, frequently undergo our 
destiny just because we think of our world in the same way as the 
fictional characters think of their own. Fiction suggests that perhaps 
our view of the actual world is as much imperfect as that of fictional 
characters. This is why successful fictional characters become para-
mount examples of the ‘real’ human condition.2 
 
 
Об онтологии литературных героев: семиотический подход 
 
Почему нас глубоко затрагивает судьба Анны Карениной, если мы 
полностью осознаем, что она — вымысел и в реальном мире ее не 
существует? Но в каком смысле литературные герои не существуют? 
Темой настоящей статьи является как раз онтология литературных 
героев. Автор приходит к выводу, что «удавшиеся» литературные 
герои становятся важными примерами «настоящей» жизни, так как 
они живут в неполноценном мире, который для нас познавательно 
доступен, но на который мы не можем повлиять и в котором случив-
шееся уже нельзя изменить. В отличие от всех других семиотических 
объектов, которые изменяются в культуре (и подобно, возможно, 
только математическим объектам), литературные герои никода не 
меняются и остаются героями своих действий во веки веков.    
                                                 
1   On these questions see Eco, Umberto 1979. The Role of the Reader. Bloo-
mington: Indiana University Press. 
2   A version of this text has been presented by the author in the University of 
Tartu on May 6, 2009. 
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Kirjanduslike kangelaste ontoloogiast: semiootiline lähenemine 
 
Miks meid liigutab sügavalt Anna Karenina saatus, kui me oleme samal 
ajal täiesti teadlikud sellest, et Anna Karenina on lihtsalt kirjanduslik kuju 
ja teda ei ole reaalselt meie maailmas olemas? — Kuid mida see tähendab, 
et kirjanduslikke kangelasi pole olemas? Käesoleva artikli teemaks on 
kirjandustegelaste ontoloogia. Autor järeldab, et edukatest kirjandustege-
lastest saavad “tegeliku” elu väljapaistvad näited, sest nad elavad ebatäie-
likus maailmas, millele meil on kognitiivne ligipääs, kuid mida me ei saa 
mõjutada ning kus tegusid ei saa olematuks teha. Erinevalt kõigist teistest 
semiootilistest objektidest, mida kultuuriliselt muudetakse, ja sarnaselt 
ehk ainsana matemaatilistele objektidele, ei muutu kirjanduslikud kange-
lased kunagi ning jäävad oma tegude kangelasteks igavesest ajast igavesti. 
 
 
